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Abstract In this comment, I reply to criticisms of my article on the trial of seven
defendants accused of providing the public with misleading information shortly before the
L’Aquila, central Italy, earthquake of 6 April 2009.
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The trial of seven defendants after the L’Aquila earthquake of 2009 is a highly contro-
versial issue and is likely to remain so for a considerable time into the future (Scolobig
et al. 2014). I thank Gabrielli and Di Bucci (2014) for their comment on my article
(Alexander 2014) and welcome the opportunity to debate this topic and defend my position
on it.
Regarding the denigration of the term ‘‘L’Aquila trial’’ as ‘so-called’, I believe that this
epithet is a good shorthand way of referring to the process. However, one thing it does not
do is to convey the endless subtleties, numerous facets and abundant opportunities for
multiple interpretations of this event.
Regarding comments about ‘‘untrue and inexact statements, misleading reasoning
processes’’ and ‘‘contradictions, inaccuracies and false statements throughout the text [of
my article]’’, I disagree with and strongly dispute all such judgements. To begin with, the
observation that ‘‘most of [my] references are not peer reviewed’’ belies the fact that many
of the best and most insightful comments on the L’Aquila trial were not made in peer-
reviewed publications. My aim was not to legitimise my comments with the device of peer
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get at the truth behind the trial and examine its implications.
Another observation made by Gabrielli and Di Bucci is that ‘‘the point of view of the
defendants is completely neglected’’. First, the weaknesses in the prosecution case are
brought out on page 1,170 of my article. Secondly, it was hardly necessary to promote the
case for the defence, given the ability of the defendants to state their own case. For
example, Enzo Boschi published his personal justiﬁcation in Science magazine (Boschi
2013), which, however, did not allow the International Seismic Safety Organisation to
publish a rejoinder. This is hardly surprising, given that the American Association for the
Advancement of Science so substantially overreached itself with the petition in favour of
the defendants and its open letter to the President of Italy. AAAS is the publisher of
Science.
According to Gabrielli and Di Bucci, ‘‘the defence was based on scientiﬁc reports and
on depositions provided by top scientists’’. That may be so, but the prosecution case was
put together at least as well, with similar depositions. Moreover, there are some ines-
capable facts. The ﬁrst of these is that the Commissione Grandi Rischi (CGR) unequiv-
ocally stated that an earthquake sequence would not be punctuated with a major shock
(L’Espresso 2009), even though its members were meeting in the very city where this had
happened, in 1703, with major loss of life. The overwhelming reaction of the external
commentators was that ‘‘science is on trial’’, and this view has persisted (Elliott 2013). It
was manifestly not the case. The seven defendants were not tried for their role or ability as
scientists. In Italy, as in other countries, it is perfectly possible for scientists to have
additional roles that utilise their expertise and judgement. In this context, if controversial
decisions have to be taken, I see something of a contradiction in the role of the CGR as an
independent body that is nevertheless part of the Dipartimento Nazionale di Protezione
Civile. This implies a lack of adequate deﬁnition, or at least separation, of responsibilities.
However, regardless of this, the CGR behaved impeccably in the Pollino earthquake swarm
of 2012 and the Garfagnana-Lunigiana seismic sequence of 2013–2014 (Paparella 2013,
p. 61). Clearly, something about living with seismic risk had been learnt from the L’Aquila
experience.
Regarding misstatement of the duration of the trial, this depends on how the
beginning and ending are deﬁned, as all trials involve preparatory work and this one
was no exception. In any case, the length of the trial was not particularly germane to
its outcome.
As much of the controversy about the L’Aquila earthquake concerns science, its use and
its misuse, it is interesting to see my methodology called into question. Gabrielli and Di
Bucci state: ‘‘we wonder why the motivations for the prosecution are taken from a
newspaper… and not from the primary source, i.e. the judge’s sentence that is publicly
available’’. In fact, the motivation for the sentence had not been written when the article
was submitted, but was made available during the latter stages of processing the manu-
script. However, the publication of this 800-page document (Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012)
did not suggest to me that any signiﬁcant changes were required in my interpretations. As
one can see from the reference list of my article, I took information from a wide variety of
sources, not merely newspapers.
As can be deduced from both my article and Gabrielli’s and Di Bucci’s reply, there
is some confusion about exactly who were the plaintiffs in the trial. The ofﬁcial report
of the judges (Tribunale di L’Aquila 2012) lists the original plaintiffs as acting on
behalf of 37 people who died and ﬁve who were injured. This was reduced at the start
of the trial to 30 of the dead and four of the injured. The provisions for compensation
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the earthquake.
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According to Gabrielli and Di Bucci, ‘‘it is reported that the L’Aquila earthquake
‘‘damaged about 100,000 buildings’’, whereas in reality, they were ca. 35,000’’—possibly,
but that depends on how damage is deﬁned. About twice as many municipalities reported
damage as those that were ofﬁcially classiﬁed as damaged. Although it was in their
interests to do so, and perhaps to exaggerate the effects of the earthquake, examination of
the surrounding municipalities reveals that their level of seismic vulnerability is extremely
high. Damage in any strong motion is bound to be excessive. Early estimates (C ¸elebi et al.
2010) indicated that 60,000 buildings may have been visibly damaged and tens of thou-
sands of others required precautionary evacuation.
Regarding video evidence, Dr De Bernadinis did indeed make the statement that the
public should relax, go home and have a glass of Montepulciano d’Abruzzo wine. On this
basis, the video ‘‘went viral’’ on YouTube.
2 There is no indication in the video of exactly
when De Bernadinis gave the interview, except that the ﬁlmed sequence includes views of
the meeting, and strongly gives the impression that it was recorded at the conclusion. If this
was not the case, then De Bernadinis had absolutely no justiﬁcation for prejudging the
outcome.
Concerning the seismic classiﬁcation of L’Aquila city, it was not my intention to give
the impression that it was established in 1980. However, this year was a turning point, as it
came at a key moment in the ‘‘Applied Geodynamics Project’’ (Progetto Finalizzato
Geodinamica), which had investigated many aspects of the seismicity of Italy (Sabetta
et al. 2001). It is very hard to imagine that there would be a scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for
‘‘bending’’ the high seismicity category around L’Aquila in such a way that left it in the
second (moderate) category. Major problems of soft sediments, karstic tunnelling and
topographic ampliﬁcation are present in the city, which also has active faults within its
limits. Yet for decades, it was classiﬁed as of lower seismicity than the surrounding
municipalities. It is therefore signiﬁcant that during the 2009 earthquake more people died
in the collapse of reinforced concrete buildings than in older masonry ones (Alexander and
Magni 2013).
The meeting of 31 March 2009 was indeed ostensibly held to examine the seismic
phenomena that had been occurring for months in the L’Aquila area. However, as the
participants appear not to have made any serious evaluation of these phenomena, and
instead made a number of statements that the prosecution and judges felt were unsub-
stantiated by science, then the written reason (see L’Espresso 2009, p. 1) does not coincide
with the real motive for holding the meeting. It is an undeniable fact that public disquiet
had been growing since the point at which Giuliani’s ‘‘prediction’’ was leaked. At the time,
the response to Giuliani and the desire to calm the public clearly dominated the agenda.
In my article, I quoted some pronouncements, from among many, by scientists outside
Italy, which clearly demonstrate a lack of understanding of the trial. Certainly, there were
those who understood it, but let them all be judged by their words.
1 Alloggia Silvana, Bonanni Anna Berardina, Cacioppo Stefania, Carosi Claudia, Ciancarella Elvezia,
Cinque Davide, Cinque Matteo, Cora Alessandra, Cora Antonella, Di Bernardo Cinzia, Fioravanti Claudio,
Fulcheri Ana Paola, Germinelli Chiara Pia, Germinelli Rosa, Germinelli Giuseppina, Germinelli Micaela,
Giugno Francesco, Giugno Luigi, Hamade Hussein, Ianni Franca, Liberati Vezio, Massimino Patrizia,
Parisse Maria Paola, Parisse Domenico, Placentino Ilaria, Rambaldi Ilaria, Shain Hisham, Spaziani Claudia,
Tomei Paola, Visione Daniela and Vittorini Fabrizia.
2 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLIMHe0NnW8.
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enhanced earthquake risk were correct. In an interview with the German press agency
Deutsche Welle shortly after the earthquake (cited by, among others, the Italian Minister of
Defence when he appeared on national television), I suggested that the question of whether
earthquakes could be predicted in the short term was irrelevant to the case. What mattered
was whether the capacity existed to respond to the alarm. Other analysts have taken a
similar view (e.g. Scolabig et al. 2014). It is an inconvenient fact that Giuliani raised the
alarm and a seismic disaster subsequently occurred. One is inclined to attribute this to
coincidence rather than scientiﬁc prowess, but nevertheless the ofﬁcial response needs to
be examined in the light of what could be done, or should have been done to respond to the
situation, other than attempt to calm the population and suppress the messenger. Mean-
while, more meticulous and rigorous analyses remain equivocal about the presence or
absence of radon anomalies at the time of the earthquake (cf. Quattrocchi et al. 2012, Pitari
et al. 2014).
One of the most distasteful aspects of the L’Aquila earthquake aftermath was the attempt
to discredit Giuliani on the basis of his position, not his ideas. It would have been easy
enough to do so purely on the basis of the latter, but instead, his detractors felt that he had to
be belittled. The attempt to do the same with Dr Antonio Ciccozzi, using bibliometry, is
equally distasteful. Ciccozzi’s (2013) book, The Word of Science (Parola di Scienza), offers
184 pages of insight and reﬂection on the earthquake, its aftermath and the trial. None of this
is diminished by its absence from Scopus. Those who would use bibliometry as a justiﬁ-
cation should consider some of the critiques of it (e.g. Moustafa 2014).
Lest there be any suspicion of a conspiracy, I would like to point out that the Inter-
national Seismic Safety Organisation is run by diverse people in diverse parts of the world,
not merely L’Aquila, and my membership of it does not preclude me from presenting my
own views, which are entirely independent of any ‘ofﬁcial line’ that ISSO may take, or
consensus that it may encourage.
My statement about the actions of civil protection in Paganica is based on reports from
reliable eye witnesses and is not intended as any kind of an indictment of the national
Department of Civil Protection (DPC), but as a statement about what actually happened.
However, although local civil protection authorities acted in this case, the policy and
strategy were clearly set nationally. Reassuring advice was given by civil protection
representatives, and whether they were DPC employees or not had little bearing in its
outcome. I noted (Alexander 2014, p. 1170) that the link between this advice and the
culpability of the defendants in the trial was the weakest part of the prosecution’s case. It
may well be sufﬁcient reason to exonerate the defendants at appeal.
My comments on the reduced role of local and regional authorities in the aftermath were
based on personal observation and wide reading. I stand by them. As is so often the case in
Italy, the political situation in Abruzzo after the earthquake was undeniably very complex.
In a country with a Prime Minister who had gained a reputation for passing laws ad
hominem, it should astonish no one if comments are made about the ﬁght for the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, which has been under attack for many years. When the then
Prime Minister passed on to promoting ad aziendam laws on behalf of his own commercial
companies, many felt that he had overreached himself (Travaglio 2010). It seems to me
quite disingenuous to describe as ‘‘frankly astonishing’’ a view that the trial has political
signiﬁcance, which is something that very many analysts and commentators, both Italian
and foreign, have noted (Guarnieri 2013).
The ﬁnal comments in Gabrielli’s and Di Bucci’s critique of my article imply that I was
trying to arrive at a judgement on the sentence. This is explicitly what I did not set out to
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referents of the trial is not a matter of trying to judge whether it was fair or unfair, but of
understanding the context in which the trial took place, and how that context inﬂuenced the
decision to prosecute. In my view, some elements of the trial were fair and well justiﬁed,
others much less so. The ﬁnal balance awaits the outcome of one or more appeals by the
defendants against their sentences.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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